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ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
The District Court Erred By Applying An Incorrect Legal Standard In Determining 
Silver Was In Custody For Purposes Of Miranda Prior To His Formal Arrest 
A. Introduction 
The district court erred when it relied on Silver's reasonable belief that he 
was going to be placed under arrest in determining whether Silver was already in 
custody for purposes of Miranda 1 when he made incriminating statements to 
officers. The district court thus erred when it granted Silver's motion to suppress 
those statements. 
On appeal, Silver does not dispute that the district court utilized an 
incorrect standard, but instead argues that the district court's ultimate conclusion 
to suppress the statements was correct. (See generally, Respondent's brief.) 
Silver's argument fails because a review of the totality of the circumstances 
reveals that he was not actually in custody for purposes of Miranda until he was 
formally arrested. 
B. Silver Was Not In Custody For Purposes Of Mianda Until His Formal 
Arrest 
The test for determining whether an individual is in custody for purposes of 
Miranda is whether, considering the totality of the circumstances surrounding the 
interrogation, there was a "formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of 
the degree associated with a formal arrest." California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 
1121, 1125 (1983) (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977)). 
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
1 
Relevant factors in making this determination include the time, location, 
public visibility of the interrogation, the conduct of the officers, the nature and 
manner of the questioning, the extent to which officers confront the suspect with 
evidence of his guilt, and the presence of other persons. State v. Medrano, 123 
Idaho 114, 117, 844 P.2d 1364, 1367 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Albaugh, 133 
Idaho 587, 591, 990 P.2d 753, 757 (Ct. App. 1999); see also U.S. v. Brobst, 558 
F.3d 982, 995-997 (91h Cir. 2009). Because the "in custody" test for Miranda 
requires a restraint on freedom associated with formal arrest, a person subjected 
to an investigative detention based on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, 
although not "free to leave," is ordinarily not in custody for purposes of Miranda. 
See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984). 
In this case, the district court suppressed incriminating statements made 
by Silver after police officers located marijuana on Silver's person and in his car. 
(R., pp.71-86.) The court concluded that by this point during Silver's contact with 
the officers, Silver had a "reasonable belief that he was going to be placed under 
arrest." (R., p.83.) The district court erred because the legal standard for 
determining whether an individual is in custody for purposes of Miranda is not 
whether a reasonable person believes they will be put into custody to a degree 
associated with formal arrest, but rather whether a reasonable person believes 
they are presently in custody to a degree associated with formal arrest. See 
State v. Silva, 134 Idaho 848, 854, 11 P.3d 44, 50 (Ct. App. 2000). 
On appeal, Silver does not dispute that the district court applied an 
incorrect legal standard. Instead, Silver emphasizes this Court's free review of 
2 
the district court's legal conclusion and that "[t]he sole issue this Court needs to 
determine is whether the district court was correct in finding that Silver was in 
custody for the purposes of [Miranda]." (Respondent's brief, pp.5-6.) However, 
a review of the record reveals that Silver was not in custody for purposes of 
Miranda until he was formally arrested. 
In contending that Silver was in custody for purposes of Miranda by the 
time officers recovered marijuana from his vehicle, Silver relies primarily on the 
officers' confronting of Silver with this evidence, and the nature of their 
questioning regarding Silver's drug activity. (See Respondent's brief, pp.6-9.) 
Silver essentially contends that what began as a "routine" traffic stop evolved into 
a custodial arrest by virtue of this questioning, which exceeded the scope of the 
purpose of the original stop, and which included threats of future arrest. (Id.) 
At what point a traffic stop is no longer "routine" was also the focus 
employed by a majority of the Idaho Court of Appeals in State v. James, Docket 
No. 33895, 2008 Opinion No. 56 (Ct. App. June 13, 2008) (overruled .Qy State v. 
James, 148 Idaho 574, 225 P.3d 1169 (2010)). While recognizing that "routine" 
traffic stops do not implicate Miranda, the Idaho Court of Appeals found that 
events occurring during James' traffic stop, including the officer's threat to arrest 
all of the occupants in the car and James' admission of ownership of 
methamphetamine found in his vehicle, "significantly distinguish[ed] [the case] 
from an ordinary traffic stop." James, Docket No. 33895, 2008 Opinion No. 56, 
p.3. 
3 
The Idaho Supreme Court overruled the Idaho Court of Appeals and 
concluded that the officer's discovery of methamphetamine in the vehicle, the 
existence of probable cause to arrest all three occupants of the vehicle, and the 
officer's threats to perform such arrests, did not transform the investigative 
detention into a formal arrest for the purposes of Miranda where there was an 
absence of other factors associated with formal arrest. James, 148 Idaho at 576-
578, 225 P.3d at 1171-1173. In James, as in the present case, it was only the 
discovery of the drugs and the subsequent questioning of the suspects that 
placed the case in "a unique circumstance in considering whether James was 'in 
custody' for Miranda purposes." See James, Docket No. 33895, 2008 Opinion 
No. 56, pp.4-6 (Perry, J. dissenting). 
Indeed, while Miranda is not implicated during "routine" traffic stops, 
Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 422-425, James makes clear that it does not follow from 
Berkemer that Miranda warnings are required in all non-routine traffic stops. 
Specifically, Miranda warnings are not necessarily required where evidence 
found in the course of a routine traffic stop establishes probable cause of drug 
crimes. The traffic stop in James was anything but routine once the officers 
discovered methamphetamine. In a Miranda custody analysis, the proper focus 
is on the restraint of liberty placed on a suspect, not whether the stop is routine. 
Specifically, as the Colorado Supreme Court explained in People v. 
Figueroa-Ortega, 283 P.3d 691, 693 (Colo. 2012), the United States Supreme 
Court, in its Miranda custody analyses, has emphasized those factors which 
4 
constitute infringements on liberty typically distinguishing a mere investigative 
stop from an arrest: 
Because interrogation can be custodial only if the person 
being interrogated has at least been stopped, the non-exclusive list 
of factors frequently identified as bearing on the question of 
whether a reasonable person would no longer feel free to leave, 
and therefore whether he has been seized at all, remains relevant 
for Miranda purposes. See People v. Matheny, 46 P.3d 453, 456-
466 (Colo. 2002). Because, however, that general list of factors 
was actually developed to determine whether an encounter with law 
enforcement officers has ceased to be consensual and therefore 
has progressed beyond a contact short of a stop to a 
constitutionally cognizable investigatory stop, see United States v. 
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980); see a/so People v. Pancoast, 
659 P .2d 1348, 1350 (Colo. 1982), both this court and the [United 
States] Supreme Court have emphasized more specifically those 
infringements on liberty typically distinguishing a mere investigatory 
stop from an arrest. By way of example, we have previously found 
that, although not dispositive, drawn guns and physical restraints 
like the use of handcuffs are more typically associated with an 
arrest than a mere stop, see People v. Breidenback, 875 P.2d 879 
(Colo. 1994 ), and that making clear to a detainee that he will not be 
released after a short investigatory stop is similarly indicative of 
arrest, see People v. Polander, 41 P .3d 698, 705 (Colo. 2001 ). In 
Berkemer itself, the Supreme Court emphasized the importance, 
from a detainee's perspective, of being removed to a secluded 
place, even if only a patrol car, rather than being questioned in 
public view, as would be more typical of an investigatory stop. 468 
U.S. at 438. 
Figueroa-Ortega, 283 P.3d at 692-693 (holding a suspect was not in custody for 
purposes of Miranda even after detective confronted the suspect with video 
surveillance evidence of a restaurant burglary). 
The confronting of a suspect with evidence of his guilt, and the 
questioning of a suspect about that evidence, are factors distinguishing a casual 
encounter from an investigative detention. However, "[t]hose infringements on 
liberty typically distinguishing a mere investigatory stop from an arrest," such as 
5 
physical restraints, drawn weapons, removal of a suspect from public view, and 
statements to a suspect that he is under arrest, were simply not present during 
Silver's contact with law enforcement prior to his formal arrest. 
Further, while an officer's confronting of a suspect with evidence of his 
guilt can be a factor in establishing Miranda custody, the officers' confronting of 
Silver with the discovered marijuana is not as strong a custody factor as the 
corresponding confrontation in James. In James, officers confronted the 
suspects with evidence that gave the officers probable cause to arrest those 
suspects for felony methamphetamine possession. James, 148 Idaho at 578, 
225 P.3d at 1173. In the present case, officers could confront Silver with 
evidence that gave them probable cause to arrest him for the misdemeanor 
crime of possession of under three ounces of marijuana. See l.C. § 37-
2732(c)(3). The latter type of confrontation is less likely to cause a reasonable 
person to believe his freedom of movement has been restrained to the degree 
associated with a formal arrest, because it remains possible in such a situation 
that an officer will merely issue a misdemeanor citation. Consistent with the 
existence of this possibility, before Silver was arrested, the officers in the present 
case only discussed with him the potential of future arrest. (See generally 
State's Exhibit A.) 
Neither the district court nor Silver has persuasively distinguished James. 
On appeal, Silver states: 
The State relies on James to support its claim that Silver 
was not subject to a custodial interrogation. However, this reliance 
is misplaced. In James, the Idaho Supreme Court held that "a 
6 
conditional threat of future lawful arrest alone does not transform a 
detention into 'custody' for purposes of Miranda." 
However, unlike the suspect in James, Silver's interrogation 
was not limited to the threat of future, lawful arrest. In fact, the 
threat of future arrest was only one of a myriad of factors that 
suggest that Silver was subject to a custodial interrogation. It was 
past midnight by the time the officers began questioning Silver 
about marijuana. Likewise, there were two officers at the scene, 
late at night, both in marked vehicles, both in uniform and both 
armed. There were no other people present at the scene. In 
addition, as with the officers in [State v. Myers, 118 Idaho 608, 798 
P .2d 453 (Ct. App. 1990)], the questioning exceeded the scope of 
the investigatory stop. As noted by the district court, there would 
be no reason for the officers to inquire as to Silver's intended 
purpose of the marijuana found at the scene, other than to elevate 
a misdemeanor to a felony. 
(Respondent's brief, pp.8-9 (citations and footnotes omitted).) 
The "myriad of factors" that Silver suggests supports the district court's 
granting of his motion to suppress was largely also present in James. As in the 
present case, James' encounter with police occurred after midnight, following a 
traffic stop, with only two officers and the suspects present. James, 148 Idaho at 
575-578, 225 P .3d at 1170-1173. Further, in both cases, the officers' questioning 
of the suspects exceeded the scope of the original traffic stops once evidence of 
drug possession was discovered. !Q,, In the present case, as in James, the 
absence of other factors that more closely implicate techniques with which 
Miranda was concerned, such as physical restraint, removal from a public place, 
police domination, or affirmative police statements indicating current arrest, were 
simply not present prior to Silver's formal arrest. 
The district court applied an incorrect legal standard in determining 
whether Silver was in custody for purposes of Miranda at the time he made 
7 
incriminating statements to law enforcement officers. Application of the correct 
standard reveals that Silver was not actually in Miranda custody until his formal 
arrest. Reversal of the district court's granting of Silver's motion to suppress is 
therefore appropriate. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to reverse the district court's 
order suppressing Silver's statements and to remand for further proceedings. 
DATED this 14th day of February 2013. 
MARK W. OLSON 
Deputy Attorney General 
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